179 ideas
| 14519 | It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus] |
| 22733 | Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 14518 | In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus] |
| 14052 | Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus] |
| 13291 | Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus] |
| 22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus] |
| 14523 | We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus] |
| 22240 | The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus] |
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 1484 | We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
| 14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
| 2670 | Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 21668 | Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 21676 | Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
| 14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
| 16554 | Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
| 14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16556 | Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
| 14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| 10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
| 14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
| 16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
| 16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
| 16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
| 16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
| 16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16562 | We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
| 1823 | We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1824 | To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
| 5949 | Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
| 1821 | Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1820 | The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1822 | Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 4549 | Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus] |
| 2668 | Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
| 1483 | Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
| 1482 | If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
| 1487 | When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus] |
| 16563 | The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16555 | Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16529 | Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16530 | A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16553 | Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16559 | Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16528 | Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 21386 | We should accept as explanations all the plausible ways in which something could come about [Epicurus] |
| 14526 | The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus] |
| 14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
| 6035 | Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius] |
| 16561 | We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 6018 | Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley] |
| 20922 | Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
| 14516 | There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus] |
| 14521 | If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus] |
| 14062 | Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus] |
| 1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
| 14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
| 1909 | How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus] |
| 16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
| 16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
| 16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
| 16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
| 16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
| 14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
| 1836 | Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus] |
| 14061 | Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus] |
| 7814 | It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling] |
| 14055 | The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus] |
| 14054 | Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus] |
| 14053 | It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus] |
| 3562 | Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus] |
| 14058 | Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus] |
| 1840 | Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14057 | All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus] |
| 1833 | Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus] |
| 14063 | Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus] |
| 14522 | What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus] |
| 14059 | The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus] |
| 1835 | True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus] |
| 1839 | Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1842 | Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus] |
| 3557 | The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas] |
| 14056 | We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus] |
| 3563 | Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus] |
| 1845 | Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus] |
| 3560 | Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus] |
| 14060 | Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus] |
| 1841 | We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14517 | We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus] |
| 14513 | Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus] |
| 1829 | A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1843 | Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus] |
| 14515 | A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus] |
| 14520 | It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus] |
| 1831 | Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 12044 | Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas] |
| 14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
| 14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
| 14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
| 14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
| 14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
| 20907 | Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| 21669 | Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus] |
| 21680 | What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus] |
| 14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
| 16558 | Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
| 14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
| 14525 | Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus] |
| 14051 | A cosmos is a collection of stars and an earth, with some sort of boundary, movement and shape [Epicurus] |
| 14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |
| 2637 | For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 2633 | Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 1828 | God does not intervene in heavenly movements, but is beyond all action and perfectly happy [Epicurus] |
| 2639 | Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 14527 | If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus] |